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9.1  Introduction 
The origin of this paper can be traced back to early February 1983, 
following my  visit to a small shoe repair shop in a suburb of Athens. 
The owner of the shop had angrily protested the decision of the firm 
that supplied him shoe polish to issue a new price list, which effectively 
raised the prices of almost all of its main products by 20 to 34 percent. 
His anger was focused not so much on the extent of the price change 
but on the fact that, contrary to his expectations, the new price list 
was issued so soon after the last list in October. He maintained that 
this was a clear violation of the client-supplier relationship, since in 
the past the implicit price contract set between them left prices  un- 
changed for a period of six to nine months. The justification provided 
by the firm for this  “breach”  of contract was the “unprecedented” 
devaluation of the drachma during the preceding month. To  this the 
shoemaker replied that the price-surveillance department of the Min- 
istry of Commerce should intervene because the polish firm used only 
domestically  produced  goods and  thus  had  used  the pretext  of  the 
devaluation to raise profits. In Okun’s terms, “customers appear willing 
to accept as fair an increase in price based on a permanent increase in 
cost” (Okun 1975). To the Athenian shoemaker the January devaluation 
did not entail a permanent increase in cost to the shoe polish firm. This 
attitude was obviously not shared by the firm itself. 
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On 9 January 1983 the Greek drachma was devalued against the U.S. 
dollar by  15.5 percent, raising the price of the dollar from 71  to 84 
drachmas. On a monthly average, the devaluation of the drachma be- 
tween December 1982 and January 1983 was 14.14 percent against the 
dollar and 14.77 percent in effective terms. As can be seen in figures 
9.1 and 9.2, this was the largest discrete change both in the bilateral 
Dr/$ rate (BZE)  and in the effective exchange rate (EFE) since the Greek 
government’s introduction of a crawling-peg system in March 1975. It 
was at that time that the drachma ceased to be pegged to the U.S. 
dollar and that a basket  of  12  currencies became  the basis for the 
conduct of  the country’s exchange rate policy. Thus, over a ten-year 
period of  managed float, the January 1983 devaluation of the drachma 
was one of the few incidents of a discrete and large adjustment of the 
exchange rate as opposed to a daily smooth crawling. 
The object of this paper is to investigate the effects of exchange rate 
management on price behavior and thus on the real exchange rate in 
a small, semi-industrialized country like Greece. 
Traditionally, the main policy objective behind a nominal devaluation 
is to promote competitiveness in third  markets and to improve the 
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balance  of  payments.  J-curve  considerations  aside, the balance-of- 
payments effects following a nominal devaluation depend on the extent 
to which the real exchange rate is depreciated and on the effects of the 
real exchange rate adjustment on net export receipts. Regarding the 
first factor there is already an extensive literature on the subject that 
focuses on the potential adjustment of the relative price of  domestic 
to traded goods following a devaluation.'  An increase in the price of 
traded goods relative to nontraded goods as a result of  a devaluation 
shifts demand toward the nontraded goods sector, giving rise to a current- 
account surplus that increases reserves and the money  supply. The 
degree of balance-of-payments  improvement  depends on elasticities, 
income and absorption effects, conditions in asset markets, and, finally, 
expectations. Eventually, the price of nontraded goods will rise to its 
steady-state level. In the meantime employment and output in the non- 
traded goods sector will increase (Katseli 1980). 
As I have shown elsewhere (Katseli 1980) these results are sensitive 
to the underlying assumptions regarding the structural characteristics 
of the economy and, more specifically, to the degree of wage indexation 
and the presence of imported intermediate goods. In both these cases 298  Louka T.  Katseli 
the demand shift is coupled with a cost shift, making the effects on the 
real exchange rate, the output response, and the balance of payments 
at best ambiguous. 
In the absence of an adjustment of the real exchange rate, a deval- 
uation can work solely through a real balance effect. The increase in 
the price of foreign exchange then reduces real balances. If the demand 
for money is exogenously determined,* the excess demand for money 
is translated into a reduction in absorption and a balance-of-payments 
surplus that is the vehicle by which money balances are replenished 
(Katseli 1983). In this case, as absorption is reduced the improvement 
in  the balance of payments  is achieved at the expense of  real con- 
sumption in the economy and output and employment in the nontraded 
goods sector. Given these considerations, it is important to look at the 
implications  of  exchange  rate  management  for  real  exchange  rate 
developments. 
The central hypothesis of this paper is that both the extent and the 
speed of  adjustment of the real exchange rate are influenced by the 
way in which the central bank  manages the nominal exchange rate. 
Specifically, a large discrete adjustment of the nominal exchange rate 
is more likely to result in a rapid adjustment of prices than is a policy 
of a smooth and continuous crawling peg. To use Cooper’s (1973) ter- 
minology, whether exchange rate policy occupies the “high-” or “low- 
politics realm”  does in fact matter in a country’s international com- 
petitiveness  and  in  the  output  and  employment  effects  during  the 
adjustment period. 
If domestic prices instantaneously adjust to their steady-state level, 
the improvement in  the balance of  payments  can come about  only 
through a natural or policy-induced squeeze in absorption. In both cases 
the effects of  the devaluation will tend to be stagflationary, at least in 
the nontraded goods sector. 
The channel through which management  of  the nominal exchange 
rate influences real exchange rate developments is the process of price 
adjustment. As will be shown in section 9.2, this process has at least 
two important features, namely, the magnitude and the frequency of 
price changes. The existing finance literature on exchange rate policy 
has in general focused on the first aspect only, that is, on the respon- 
siveness of domestic prices to a nominal devaluation. The industrial 
organization and macroeconomics literature, on the other hand, has 
increasingly focused on sluggishness. As Barro (1972, 17) has noticed, 
The firm’s elastic demand curve must be discarded in disequilibrium 
if the firm is ever to change price. In this sense the response of prices 
to disequilibrium is essentially a monopolistic phenomenon even if 
the individual units perform as perfect competitors in equilibrium. 299  Discrete Devaluation as a Signal to Price Setters 
Therefore, it seems clear that a theory of monopolistic price adjust- 
ment is a prerequisite to a general theory of price adjustment. 
Monopolistic  price  adjustment  implies joint  determination  of  two 
pricing features on the part of  the firm: the length of the implicit or 
explicit “price contract,” and the magnitude of the adjustment at the 
end of the contract period. As Gray (1976) has shown, analogous mod- 
eling can be applied to the workings of a labor market characterized 
by the existence of a strong union. In that case the contract length and 
the indexing parameter are the important contract characteristics. 
In merging these two strands of the literature, this paper argues that 
exchange rate management can affect both the length of the price con- 
tract between firms and clients and the magnitude of the price adjust- 
ment. This hypothesis can be tested directly only through the use of 
micro or firm-level data, since the path of price adjustment varies across 
firms. These data are in fact available for Greek firms. As will be shown 
in section 9.3,  the prices set by Greek firms for specific products exhibit 
properties of a step function. The contract length and the magnitude 
of the price adjustment can thus be investigated in relation to exchange 
rate management. 
The econometric analysis of price behavior by firms is complicated, 
however, by  the existence of  special institutional characteristics  of 
trading. More specifically, most developing countries are apt to employ 
some institutional mechanism  for price  surveillance or direct price 
controls. 
In the case of Greece, price controls have existed since the mid 1930s. 
After World War I1 they covered only a small number of products and 
were intended to curb excessive profits earned from the sale of goods 
in  short supply. Over time, those controls were  extended  to cover 
numerous other products by specifying price ceilings or maximum al- 
lowable markups over costs. The type of control that has been used 
has varied across goods and business operations and has been appli- 
cable to the industry, the wholesaler,  or  the retailer, that is, to any 
stage within the production and distribution systems (Lalonde and Pa- 
pandreou 1984). 
The complexity of the system thus seriously  hinders an extensive 
analysis of price behavior by firms unless one investigates thoroughly 
the underlying institutional arrangements that affect each specific prod- 
uct or enterprise. In the presence of  differentiated product controls, 
profit-maximizing behavior on the part of firms implies that the pricing 
of  noncontrolled goods also departs from the expected pricing under 
free-market conditions. It has been observed, for example, that firms 
tend to price overall production in such a way as to ensure large enough 
profits in some lines of production and thus cover losses generated in 300  Louka T.  Katseli 
the production of price-controlled products. It follows that an increase 
in expected or actual costs affects not only the overall price level but 
also the relative prices of different commodities. 
In view of these complexities, the central hypotheses of this paper 
can be formulated as follows. Section 9.2 argues that discrete adjust- 
ment of the exchange rate tends to shorten the implicit price contract 
between sellers and buyers and to augment the rate of price adjustment. 
This is so because firms tend to strengthen their expectations about an 
overall increase in costs and about an aggregate shift in the demand 
curve for the firms’ output. A discrete change in the exchange rate thus 
acts as an “information signal” in the market that leads to a relatively 
rapid overall price adjustment of  traded and nontraded goods alike. 
Given the presence of controls, the prices of noncontrolled goods should 
tend to adjust faster than those of controlled goods, even though sooner 
or later the regulatory agency itself is apt to allow price increases in 
the controlled part of the market. The output response to these effects 
depends not only on the expected increase in  demand for the firm’s 
output  relative  to its costs, but  also on the ability of  each firm to 
diversify  production  with  commodities  that  are exempt from  price 
controls. 
The econometric analysis provided in section 9.3 should be inter- 
preted with caution. Given the existing institutional complexities, it 
has to be conducted at the macro, sectoral, and product levels. Even 
though the existing evidence is not conclusive, the data do not reject 
the central hypotheses of section 9.2, making this line of research both 
interesting and promising. 
9.2  The Magnitude and Frequency of Price Adjustment Following a 
Discrete Adjustment of the Exchange Rate 
In the international finance literature exchange rate  management 
has been analyzed in the context of the benefits and costs of alternative 
exchange rate regimes.  As early as 1970, Cooper and other authors 
argued for greater exchange rate flexibility on three separate grounds: 
to provide smoother adjustment to changing fundamentals; to avoid 
speculative runs on the national currency; and to reestablish the ef- 
fectiveness of monetary policy (Cooper 1973). 
As consensus on the advisability of flexible exchange rates grew, the 
focus of attention shifted to the manner in which the “gliding parity” 
should be managed. It was demonstrated, for example, that exchange 
rate adjustment could be unstable if the rate of change in the nominal 
exchange rate followed the rate of change in foreign exchange reserves, 
as opposed to following developments in the current-account or the 
basic balance (Rodriguez 1981).  The so-called shock treatment, namely, 301  Discrete Devaluation as a Signal to Price Setters 
an unexpected sudden devaluation or revaluation of the nominal ex- 
change rate, was judged inferior to the “gradualist solution” because 
it was considered highly unlikely that central authorities would possess 
the necessary  information to arrive at an equilibrium real exchange 
rate through discrete action (Rodriguez 1981). 
Despite the advantages of  continuous exchange rate adjustment to 
correct underlying fundamental disequilibria,  a number of  countries 
during recent years have chosen to pursue a discrete adjustment policy. 
Sweden, Spain, and Greece are the most recent examples. 
Discrete adjustment of the nominal exchange rate has usually been 
associated with either political transitions or  interruptions in the normal 
conduct of exchange rate policy. It is thus undertaken at the beginning 
of a new government’s term in office in an attempt to slow the necessary 
rate of devaluation in the following year and to attribute the need for 
the adjustment to earlier government policy. This scenario probably 
applies to both Sweden and Spain. Discrete adjustment is also initiated 
during periods when, for various economic or institutional reasons, the 
real exchange rate becomes overvalued, giving rise to speculative runs 
on the currency. In both cases the discrete adjustment of the nominal 
exchange rate is a response to growing disequilibria in the economy. 
Finally, discrete adjustment is also used by policy makers to influence 
expectations about the future rate of devaluation and thus the rate of 
inflation. It is often a signal for a reversal in policy stance and is usually 
accompanied by other changes in fiscal or monetary policies. This is 
the most likely explanation for the Greek case. Such adjustment, if 
credible,  could  in  fact  have  negative  real  effects  on  output  and 
employment. 
As  Calvo (1981) has  shown, an unanticipated devaluation always 
improves the balance of payments of a small, open economy, whereas 
below a certain critical deficit level, an increase in the rate of deval- 
uation could bring about a deterioration. In the presence of nontraded 
goods, these results will continue to hold, especially if the relative price 
of  traded  to nontraded  goods is  altered.  A  devaluation of  the real 
exchange rate3 thus  strengthens the case for a balance-of-payments 
improvement (Katseli 1983). If, as a response to an unanticipated de- 
valuation, the prices  of  nontraded  goods jump to their steady-state 
value, then even the transitory improvement in the balance of payments 
could be questioned. This is especially true in developing countries, 
where the decrease in absorption might be limited by inflationary ex- 
pectations that lead to an increase in consumption and imports of du- 
rables or to an accumulation of inventories. Furthermore, inflationary 
expectations and a decrease in output might reduce money demand, 
offsetting the excess demand for money that is necessary for a balance- 
of-payments improvement. It could therefore be argued that a deval- 302  Louka T.  Katseli 
uation of the real exchange rate is more necessary for a balance-of- 
payments improvement when the conditions for a smooth working of 
the real balance effect are unfavorable. 
Can the process of price adjustment differ depending on the way the 
exchange rate is managed? The answer would be positive if  one ana- 
lyzes price behavior in price-setting markets instead of in simple auction 
markets. As Gordon (1981) has noted, the assumption of “pervasive 
heterogeneity” in the types and quality of products and in the location 
and timing of transactions is crucial for such a theory of price adjust- 
ment. This approach thus undermines “the new classical macroeco- 
nomic models based on a one-good economy postulated by identical 
price-taking yeoman farmers”  (Gordon 1981), or Calvo’s world of  a 
one-family, one-good economy, in  which “the price level is the ex- 
change rate [that is, the relative price] of domestic currency in terms 
of some other given currency” (Calvo 1981). 
There is already a fairly substantial literature on the microeconomic 
foundations of price adjustment. Apart from issues related to the ex- 
istence of  a “non-Walrasian”  or “conjectural”  equilibrium, as early 
as the  1960s another set of contributions attributed partial price ad- 
justment to adjustment costs and incomplete information. In that tra- 
dition one could cite the works of Alchian (1969), Phelps and Winter 
(1970), Okun (1975), and more recently Blinder (1982) and 0the1-s.~ 
From that viewpoint and in sharp contrast to the prototypical firm 
in traditional short-run market analysis, pervasive heterogeneity  and 
the cost of information make each firm behave in the short and the 
medium run as a monopolist.  In that role the firm acts as a quantity 
taker and price maker. As Okun has remarked, “Even firms with min- 
uscule market shares put price tags on their commodities; in the short 
run, they are never surprised by the price, and always subject to sur- 
prise about the quantities they sell”  (Okun 1975, 360). 
Following this line of thought, Gordon has argued that the funda- 
mental reason for gradual price adjustment is the “large local com- 
ponent of actual changes in demand and costs, together with the in- 
dependence of  those costs and demand changes” (Gordon 1981, 522). 
Combining price-setting behavior by a typical monopolist with Lucas’s 
analysis of  expectation formation Gordon has reached the following 
conclusions: that price adjustment will be complete if  the perceived 
marginal cost responds fully to an aggregate shock but not if otherwise; 
that the expected cost mimics expected aggregate demand if  the ag- 
gregate variance of a shock dominates the local variance; and that only 
in the extreme case when the aggregate component of the variance of 
both demand and cost shifts is very large relative to the local com- 
ponent, as during wartime or a hyperinflation, does price adjustment 
capture fully the aggregate demand shift. 303  Discrete Devaluation as a Signal to Price Setters 
In this view, therefore, heterogeneity of products makes firms behave 
as monopolists that purchase their inputs from and sell their output to 
other firms. The extent to which a particular shock that affects cost 
and demand is perceived as “local”  or “global” critically affects pric- 
ing decisions. The adjustment of the price will be larger if a shock in 
demand is expected to affect other firms as well and thus in the end 
give rise to an increase in the firm’s input costs. 
How can this framework be applied to exchange rate management? 
In the case of  a discrete devaluation that is typically large, there is 
an  “announcement  effect.”  A  high-level official usually  announces 
to all market participants that effective immediately the prices of all 
traded goods will be  increased.  That announcement thus stimulates 
or confirms expectations, even in the nontraded  goods sector, that 
demand for output and the cost of  inputs will increase. The increase 
in production cost is expected to take the form not only of an increase 
in  the cost of  imported inputs, but also in the cost of  intermediate 
or capital goods purchased from other domestic firms. In the non- 
union  sector labor costs are expected  to rise  concomitantly,  while 
in  the  unionized  sector,  wages  are expected  to be  adjusted  at  the 
end of the contract period or when contracts are renegotiated. Dis- 
crete  adjustment  of  the  exchange  rate  thus  induces  an  expected 
increase in  the overall cost of  production,  that is, in both its local 
and its  aggregate components.  On  the  demand  side, the larger  the 
discrete devaluation, the greater the likelihood of  an overall demand 
shift in the economy and thus the smaller the perceived cost to each 
firm of  raising its own price.  A discrete adjustment of  the exchange 
rate  therefore  strengthens  expectations  regarding  inflationary  pres- 
sures in the economy that will produce an increase in both demand 
and marginal costs. 
The trade-off between price and output adjustment depends on firm 
specifics. The expected increase in marginal costs, however, is more 
likely to mirror the expected increase in demand in the case of a discrete 
change in the exchange rate than in the case of a crawling peg. Hence, 
in comparing these two regimes one would expect price rather than 
output adjustment to be dominant in the former case. 
Discrete adjustment of the exchange rate induces not only an increase 
in the average expected cost of production, but also in the variance of 
the aggregate component as opposed to the local component. As the 
local component of actual changes in demand and costs becomes small, 
price adjustment in  the specific firm tends to approximate the rate of 
devaluation. 
With a simple cost-push model similar to that developed by Gordon 
(1981), it is easy to show that the percentage change in price (Pit) will 
be positively related to a discrete change in the exchange rate, defined 304  Louka T.  Katseli 
as the ratio of the unexpected change in the exchange rate relative to 
R, - EI~R, 
its variance, or 
VarR 
For the monopolist, Pi is a weighted average of the actual change in 
nominal revenue (ai,)  and of expected changes at time t in the marginal 
costs at time t + 1, or E,(C;,+J.  Thus: 
(1)  Pit  = +a;,  + (1 - +)Et(Cit+l), 
where i refers to the specific firm, and E is the expectations operator. 
The expected change in marginal costs for the individual firm i is a 
weighted average of the actual cost increase of imported inputs and of 
the expected costs of other inputs that are determined by a different 
set of agents, including labor and other firms (W). If the change in the 
price of  imported inputs at time t is assumed to equal R, and the mean 
of the local component of  W is assumed to equal zero, it follows that: 
(2)  Et(C;,+J = ZR,  + (1 - z)(l - +)EN,+J, 
where + is the ratio of the variance of the local component of the cost 
shift to the sum of the variances of the local and aggregate components. 
Apart from a known component (m  that captures information about 
existing contracts, past pricing behavior, and known institutional fac- 
tors, expectations about non-firm-specific costs, E,( W,  + 1),  are assumed 
to be positively related to the unexpected component of the exchange 
rate change, this being defined as the difference between the actual 
change at time t and that expected during the previous period, E- ,  (Rt), 
divided by the historical variance of exchange rate changes. Thus: 
(3) 
Making all appropriate substitutions, we find that: 
Given equation (4)  it is easy to see that Pi, is positively related to 
.  More specifically if we assume that E- ,  (R,) = 0, then:  R, -  E-1 (R,) 
Var R 
(5)  aP,/a(R,Nar  R) = (1 - +)zVarR 
From equation (5) it follows that for any given unexpected change in 
the exchange rate, Pi becomes larger as the aggregate component of 
the variance of costs becomes larger in relation to the local component, 
+ (1 - *)(1  - z)(l - +)p > 0. 305  Discrete Devaluation as a Signal to Price Setters 
or + -+  0. This is probably the case when there is a switch in regimes 
from a smooth crawling peg to that of a discrete exchange rate ad- 
justment. If  this is so, then both E(W,+,)  and (1 - +) are positively 
related to R, -  E-,(R,) 
VarR  . 
Finally, it  should be noted that the increase in price will be even 
larger if  E(W,+,)  is made to represent the expected aggregate change 
in  income. In that case, as in Gordon (1981), equation  (3) could be 
replaced by: 
where the demand shift is assumed to consist of a local component and 
an aggregate component. In (3’), 8, like +, is the ratio of  the local 
component of the demand shift to the sum of the local and aggregate 
variances. The replacement of (3) by (3’) does not change the qualitative 
nature of the results. 
The analysis so far is limited to the magnitude of the price response 
to a discrete devaluation. One would expect, however, that implicit 
price contracts will also be arbitrarily shortened or renegotiated. 
In analyzing labor market contracts, Gray argued that the “optimal 
contract length is inversely  related to the variance of  the industry- 
specific shock” (Gray 1978, 11). Firms are assumed to determine the 
degree of indexation and the length of the labor contract by minimizing 
a loss function (z)  of the form: 
(6)  z  = I// (A J:  E [(In Y, - In  ~121  dt  + c), 
where  I is the contract length, and A  is a relative price that converts 
losses expressed as squared output deviations into losses expressed in 
the units of the contracting cost (0. 
Intuitively, the optimal contract length in Gray’s analysis is deter- 
mined by a condition that at the margin “balances the per period savings 
on transactions costs that could be achieved by lengthening the contract 
against the concomitant increased losses in the form of larger expected 
output and employment deviations.”  Thus, whereas  “increased  un- 
certainty brings about a shortening of contract length, increased con- 
tracting costs lead to a lengthening of contracts” (Gray 1978, 7). 
In the case of the monopolistic firm that determines both price and 
output, it is the cost of information that includes the costs of prediction 
and of establishing reliability and permanence that leads to implicitly 
long-term contractual relationships. These considerations have to be 
weighed against the profit losses that would be incurred if underpricing 306  Louka T.  Katseli 
were to continue for too long. A large discrete adjustment of the ex- 
change rate both reduces the cost of information as defined above and 
establishes, as we have seen, firms’ expectations about the prospective 
increase in costs. Since cost-oriented pricing with a markup offers the 
“most typical standard of fairness in buyer-seller relationships” (Okun 
1975) a discrete devaluation allows sellers to pursue cost-oriented price 
increases. Thus, a discrete devaluation, as opposed to a crawling peg, 
reduces the cost the firm bears in explaining to its customers the reason 
for the price increase leading to a renegotiation of existing contracts 
with those customers. 
The length of the new contracts is probably indeterminate as firms 
attempt to guess the intentions of the central bank. This is especially 
true  if  the discrete  adjustment  is  a break  from  past  exchange rate 
management practices.  If after some initial period firms believe that 
the policy marks a switch in regimes from a crawling peg toward a 
regime of discretely adjustable exchange rates and that the established 
rate is in fact tenable, implicit price contracts will again be renegotiated 
for corresponding periods of time. 
Uncertainty as to the central bank’s intentions, on the other hand, 
calls for short-period adjustment lags. Finally, the length of the rene- 
gotiated  contracts will  probably  be  the  same as before if  after the 
discrete adjustment the exchange rate continues to crawl. In all cases 
the contract length will also be affected by expectations about economic 
fundamentals and the ability of policy to correct existing disequilibria. 
In summary what can be said unambiguously is that a discrete ex- 
change rate adjustment will give rise to recontracting and also, in the 
absence of a clear signal by the government as to its intentions, to an 
increased tendency for contracts of shorter duration. This conclusion 
is similar to that of Aizenmann (1982), who in a different context argued 
that “the  optimal frequency of wage recontracting depends on mea- 
sures of aggregate volatility.” 
9.3  The Econometric Analysis 
The purpose of this section is to investigate empirically whether the 
responsiveness of nontraded goods prices to exchange rates was more 
rapid in the period following the January 1983 Greek devaluation than 
in  the previous  periods.  The analysis is therefore conducted at the 
aggregate,  sectoral, and product levels, using monthly data for two 
distinct periods: the period January  1979 to December 1983 (the long 
period), and the  period  January  1979 to December  1982 (the  short 
period). 
Table 9.1 presents a summary of Greek exchange rate statistics. The 
definitions of the notations for all the variables  therein are given in 307  Discrete Devaluation as a Signal to Price Setters 
table 9.2. It can readily be seen that both the standard deviations and 
the coefficients of variation of the effective and bilateral exchange rates 
were greater in the long period than in the short period. This can largely 
be attributed to the January 1983 devaluation (see again figures 9.1 and 
9.2), which was the largest discrete adjustment of the exchange rate 
since the beginning of the crawling-peg period. 
As shown in table 9.3, the nominal devaluation of the exchange rate 
in January 1983 produced a real exchange rate devaluation during the 
first quarter of the year on the order of 7 to 12 percent, depending on 
the index used to calculate the real effective exchange rate. By the 
second quarter of  1983, however, the real effective exchange rate re- 
turned to roughly its 1980 level as relative prices deteriorated, thereby 
dissipating some of the effects of the nominal adjustment. 
Looking more closely at the time-series properties of exchange rates 
before and after the discrete adjustment of January  1983, tables 9.4 
and 9.5 present the autoregressive structure of the relevant series for 
Table 9.1  Greek Exchange Rate Statistics 
Level of  the Exchange Rate 
1979.1-1982.12  1979.1 -  1983.12 
EFE 
Mean  52.875  49.415 
S  TD  7.501  9.687 
CVAR  0.142  0. I96 











Percentage Change in the Exchange Rate 





-  0.009 
0.013 







Mean  0.012  0.015 
STD  0.025  0.030 
CVAR  2.083  2.000 
Note:  For definitions  of  notations  used,  see table  9.2.  1979.1 denotes January  1979; 
1982.12 denotes December 1982, for example. 308  Louka T.  Katseli 
Table 9.2 
Notation  Definition 





















The effective exchange rate: the 12-currency basket as defined by the 
Bank of Greece. An increase in the index represents a nominal 
appreciation of the exchange rate. 
Source: Bank of Greece. 
represents a nominal depreciation of the exchange rate. 
Source: Bank of Greece, Monthly Statistical Bulletin, various issues. 
The bilateral Dr./U.S.$ exchange rate. An increase in the index 
Standard deviation. 
Coefficient of variation. 
The consumer price index (CPI) of  Greece relative to the weighed CPI of 
twelve trading partners, adjusted for exchange rate changes. Both 
indexes are expressed in dollars.  1970 = 1.OOO. 
Source: Bank of Greece. 
The wholesale price index (WPI) of Greece relative to the weighted  WPI 
of 21 competitor countries. Both indexes are expressed in dollars.  1980 
= 1.OOO. 
Source: Bank of Greece. 
The natural logarithm of a variable. 
The differenced natural logarithm of a variable. 
A change in the variable. 
Exchange rate. 
The contracting cost. 
Durbin-  Wat son statistic. 
Standard error of the estimation. 
Price level. 
The wholesale price index of finished products of foreign origin.  1970 = 
1  .OOo. 
Source: National Statistical Service of Greece, Statistical yearbook of 
Greece, various issues. 
primary and industrial production. 1970 =  1.000. 
Source: ibid. 
domestic consumption. 1970 = 1  .OOO. 
Source: ibid. 
consumption.  1970 = 1.000. 
Source: ibid. 
1970 =  1.OOO. 
Source: ibid. 
Source: ibid. 
The wholesale price index (WPI) of exported products of domestic 
The WPI of finished products of domestic industrial production for 
The WPI of finished products of domestic and foreign origin for domestic 
The WPI of domestically produced foodstuffs for domestic consumption. 
The consumer price index.  1970 = 1.OOO. 309  Discrete Devaluation as a Signal to Price Setters 
Table 9.3  Quarterly Data on Nominal and Real Effective Exchange Rates in 
Greece, 1980-84 
(1980 = loo) 
~~~ 
Year/ 

































-  0.57 
-  4.2 






























-  3.20 















-  0.8 
-0.5 






-  15.29 
1.61 
-  1.53 













-  7.4 
4.0 
-0.7 
-  1.8 
58.08  -  5.30  89.80  -2.7  98.2  0.1 
+A positive value denotes an appreciation; a negative value denotes a depreciation. 
both periods.  Each variable is regressed against past values of itself, 
going back roughly two quarters. As was expected, the exchange rate 
series can be described as an ARl  or random-walk process in which 
the first lagged coefficient is close to unity in both periods. This implies 
that only the constant term is significant in the autoregressive structure 
of first differences. The identification of the Greek exchange rate with 
an ARI  process is consistent with similar results obtained for most 
other European countries. In almost all cases the exchange rate in the 
current period proves to be the best predictor of the rate in the next 
period (Katseli 1984). As was expected, the coefficient of the constant 
term was higher in the long period than in the short period when the 
change in the exchange rate was more sluggish (table 9.5). 
Contrary to the experience of most European countries, wholesale 
prices in Greece also tended to exhibit properties of an ARl process, 
as shown in tables 9.6 and 9.7. In Katseli (1984) this finding also char- 
acterized price adjustment in Italy, another high-inflation country dur- 
ing the period under consideration. Only the price index of  exported 310  Louka T.  Katseli 
Table 9.4 
DEP  C  LER-  I  LER  -2  R2  fi2  D.W.  SEE 
1.  LEFE  -.0246  .9411  -.0072  .99  .98  2.06  .02 
1979.8-1983.12  (0.05)  (5.65)  (0.03) 
2.  LBIE  .0660  .7971  .0898  .99  .99  1.98  .04 
1979.1-1983.12  (0.85)  (5.25)  (0.46) 
3.  LEFE  1.5944  1.0188  -.4536  .99  .99  1.87  .003 
1979.8-1982.12  (1.49)  (4.84)  (1.52) 
4.  LBIE  .1735  .9575  -.0217 
1979.1-1982.12  (1.67)  (4.88)  (0.08) 
Time-Series  Properties of the Level of  the Exchange Rate 
Note: The estimated equation is of the form LEFE = C + alLEFEI  + . . . LX~EFE-~ 
+ Lt  + dummy variables. Only the estimated coefficients C, a,,  and a2 are reported 
here. The numbers in parentheses are t-statistics. 
products (PE) exhibited higher-order autoregressive properties, prob- 
ably as the result of a conscious pricing policy. The coefficient of the 
first-month lag of nontraded goods (LNT) was typically smaller than 
that of traded goods but rose considerably between the two periods 
under consideration. The same is true for all the other price indices, 
implying that the adjustment of prices is on average faster when 1983 
is included in the sample period. This is also reflected in the fact that 
the coefficients of the constant terms in table 9.7 are higher in all cases 
in the long period than in the short period. In the case of the NT index, 
the average monthly rate of change increased from 1.7 to 1.9 percent 
across periods, implying an even larger rate of increase in 1983 alone. 
In both the DLPM and the DLPE autoregressions, the inclusion of 1983 
raises the coefficients of the constant terms and reduces the coefficients 
of the significant lagged terms. 
These results support the hypothesis that the adjustment of the prices 
of  both traded  and nontraded goods was faster in  1983 than in  the 
previous years. The relationship of this development to exchange rate 
behavior thus provides further evidence that the discrete devaluation 
of  1983 produced an almost instantaneous  reaction in  the prices of 
traded and nontraded goods alike. 
When DLGZ  is regressed against lagged values of  itself and against 
current and lagged values of the exchange rate (effective and bilateral), 
the coefficient of the current exchange rate change term becomes large 
and significant only in the period that includes 1983, as shown in table 
9.8. The same is true in the case of DLNT, where the current effective 
exchange rate change (DLEFE) seems to influence the current change 
in nontraded goods prices only in the long period. The results are more 
mixed when the bilateral exchange rate is used instead, as shown in 
table 9.9a. What these results suggest is that the adjustments of non- Table 9.5 
DEP  C  DLER-  I  DLER-2  R2  R2  D.  W.  SEE 
Time-Series Properties of  Changes in the Exchange Rate 





1979.8 -  1982.12 
4. DLBIE 
1979.1-1982.12 






-  .0109 
.0102 
-  ,0405 
(0.28) 






-  .I574  .I3  .01  1.97  .03 
(1.10) 
,0368  .03  -  .08  2.00  .05 
(0.27) 
-  .I636  .I4  -  .01  1.99  .01 
(0.91) 
.I568  .I1  -  .02  1.85  .02 
(0.98) 
Note: The estimated equation is of the formDLEFE = C + alDLEFE-, + . . . + a&LEFE-6  + v,. Only the coefficients 
C, a,,  and a2  are reported here. The numbers in parentheses are t-statistics. Table 9.6  Time-Series Properties of the Level of Prices 
Dependent 
Variable  Constant  LPt- I  LPt-2  LPt-3  R=  R2  D.  W.  SEE 
1.  LPM 
1979.7- 1983.12 
2.  LPE 
1979.7-1983.12 
3.  LNT 
1979.7- 1983.12 
4.  LGI 
1979.7-1983.12 
5.  LPM 
1979.7- 1982.12 
6.  LPE 
1979.7  -  1982.12 
7.  LNT 
1979.7-1982.12 


































-  ,3965 
(- 1.35) 
-  ,5953 
(- 2.05) 
(0.11) 




-  ,2001 
(-1.25) 
( -  0.72) 
-  ,0065 
( -0.03) 












-  .0710 





































Note: The estimated equation is of  the form LP = C + ulLP-, + . . . + udP-6 + Lr  + dummy variables. Only the estimated 
coefficients of C,  a,,  u2,  and a3  are reported here. The numbers in parentheses are t-statistics. Table 9.7  Time-Series Properties of Price Changes 
~~ 
DEP  C  DLP-  1  DLP-2  DLP-3  R2  R2  D.  W.  SEE 
1. DLPM  ,0183  ,3883  -  .1645  ,0274  .22  .ll  I .91  .018 
1979.8 -  1983.12  (3.09)  (2.56)  (1.03)  (0.17) 
2.  DLPE  .0149  ,2568  -  ,1306  ,2251  .14  .03  1.83  ,015 
1979.8-1983.12  (2.83)  (1.81)  (0.94)  (1.61) 
3. DLNT  .0187  .0542  -  ,0879  -  .2492  .10  -  .02  1.91  ,009 
1979.8-1983.12  (2.62)  (0.39)  (0.63)  (1.76) 
4. DLGI  .0200  .1940  -  .0624  -  .I320  .09  -  .03  1.91  .008 
1979.8-1983.12  (3.39)  (1.31)  (0.42)  (0.87) 
5. DLPM  .0115  .6364  -  .1823  .I315  .36  .25  1.93  .014 
1979.8-1982.12  (2.12)  (3.65)  (0.91)  (0.70) 
6. DLPE  .0085  ,2446  ,0668  .4022  .25  .12  1.82  ,008 
1979.8- 1982.12  (1.73)  (1.56)  (0.45)  (2.69) 
7. DLNT  ,0166  .0480  -  .0990  -  ,1890  .I0  -  .06  1.94  ,007 
1979.8-1982.12  (1.96)  (0.30)  (0.61)  (1.15) 
8. DLGI  ,012  .2237  -  .0201  -  .0354  .06  -.I1  1.91  .005 
1979.8-1982.12  (1.80)  (1.29)  (0.11)  (0.20) 
Nure: The estimated equation is of the form DLP = C  + a1DLP  1  + . . . a&LP-6  + ul. Only the estimated coefficients, C,  a], 
a2,  and a3  are reported here. The numbers in parentheses are t-statistics. 314  Louka T.  Katseli 
traded goods prices and exchange rates become contemporaneous when 
1983 is included in the estimation. This can be seen clearly in figures 
9.3  and 9.4,  in which the exchange rate and price adjustments in January 
1983 are completely synchronized. 
Two additional points concerning the price adjustment of nontraded 
goods are also worth noting. The evidence presented in figures 9.3 and 
9.4 is also confirmed by the relatively low explanatory power of equa- 
tions  l  and  2 in  table  9.9. Over the entire  period  in question, the 
exchange rate was only partially responsible for the observed variation 
in nontraded goods prices, as other factors, such as imported inflation, 
wage rate adjustment, monetary developments, and the position of the 
economy over the business cycle, became more important. It was only 
in January 1983 that the devaluation of the currency became the dom- 
inant factor explaining most of the variation in LNT. Unfortunately, 
the lack of consistent monthly data prevents a disaggregated analysis 
along these lines. With quarterly data, however, it can be shown that 
for the entire period  1979.11-1983.1V, the price of imported goods in 
the domestic currency is the most important explanatory variable for 
DLNT. This variable reflects changes in both foreign prices and ex- 
change rates and thus picks up the significant terms-of-trade shocks 
undergone during the period, such as the second oil price increase. As 
one would expect, the explanatory power of the estimated equation 
(equation 5 in table 9.9b) is raised considerably when this variable is 
included. 
The lack of  sufficient disaggregation in data available also prevents 
an effective analysis of the relationship between pricing behavior and 
expectations regarding  exchange rate  adjustment.  According  to the 
evidence presented in table 9.9,  a 10 percent devaluation of the effective 
exchange rate was expected to raise the prices of nontraded goods by 
1.4 percent during the same month. The unexpected component of the 
price  change between  two consecutive  months is picked up by  the 
residual in the estimated equation. The vector of estimated residuals 
from the estimated price equation can thus be correlated or regressed 
against the current and lagged values of the residuals obtained from an 
exchange rate adjustment equation. This exercise allows an analysis 
of the responsiveness of prices to news of an impending change in the 
exchange rate. When monthly and quarterly data are used, however, 
the results are completely uninformative.  For example, although the 
correlation coefficient of the residuals was positive, it was low, never 
exceeding 0.12. Similarly, the coefficients of the current and lagged 
unexpected changes in  the exchange rate never proved to be signifi- 
cantly different from zero. 
These results probably reflect the structure of expectations regarding 
exchange rate developments. Since exchange rates are announced daily, Table 9.8 
DEP  C  DLGI-I  DLGI-2  DLBIE  DLBIE-I  DLEFE  DLEFE-I  R2  R2  D.W.  SEE 
Monthly Data on Aggregate Price Adjustment and Exchange Rate Adjustment 
1. DLGI 
1979.4- 1983.12 














.0748  ,0314 
(0.55)  (0.27) 
(1.10)  (0.22) 
(0.59)  (0.40) 
(1.05)  (0.40) 
,1546  -.0274 
,0870  -.0573 
,1684  -.0631 
-  ,2622  -  .  I368  .39  .34  2.0  .010 
(4.76)  (2.06) 
,1792  .0433  .24  .18  2.0  .01 I 
(3.57)  (0.78) 
-.1421  -.3141  .24  .17  2.0  .010 
(1.2)  (2.56) 
.0665  .0622  .09  .OO  1.97  .011 
(0.95)  (0.86) Table 9.951  Monthly Data on Nontraded Goods Price Adjustment and Exchange Rate Adjustment 
DEP  C  DLNT-I  DLNT-2  DLNT-3  DLBIE  DLBIE-I  DLBIE-2  DLEFE  DLEFE-j  DLEFE-2  R2  R2  D.W.  SEE 
1. DLNT  .0169  ,0311  -.I043  -.1635 
1979.5-1983.12  (3.54)  (0.22)  (0.75)  (1.21) 
2.  DLNT  .0206  .0541  -.I266  -.2263  .0096  -.W6  ,0788 
1979.5-1983.12  (3.90)  (0.39)  (0.92)  (1.60)  (0.52)  (0.15)  (1.24) 
3. DLNT  .0163  -.0210  -.0647  -.1127 
1979.5-1982.12  (2.91)  (0.13)  (0.44)  (0.74) 
-.1427  -.0814  -.1157 
(1.88)  (1.04)  (1.47) 
19  .09  1.95  .013 
.I0  .O1  1.93  .014 
,1255  -.3326  -.2427  .24  .12  1.90  ,014 
(0.77)  (l.%)  (1.4) 
4.  DLNT  ,0163  .0704  -.0924  -.2005  -.I457  ,0237  ,1339  .I5  .02  1.86  ,014 
1979.5-1982.12  (3.45)  (0.43)  (0.57)  (1.27)  (1.64)  (0.24)  (1.41) 
Table 9.9b  Quarterly Data on  Nontraded Goods Price Adjustment and Exchange Rate Adjustment 
DEP  C  DLNT- 1  DLW  DLPM  DLEFE- I  Rl  R2  D-W  SEE 
5. DLNT  ,0497  -.3354  -.OW  ,3465  -.1176  .34  .13  1.5  .0207 
197911-1983IV  (2.67)  (1.29)  (0.35)  (2.40)  (0.83) 317  Discrete Devaluation as a Signal to Price Setters 
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Fig. 9.3  The effective exchange rate and nontraded goods prices. 
expectations are formed or revised in a daily basis as well. It therefore 
would be interesting to proceed with the above analysis using daily 
data; unfortunately, only anecdotal evidence of price adjustment fol- 
lowing the January 9th devaluation exists, precluding an econometric 
analysis of the second-order autoregressive system. Furthermore, since 
most of the price adjustment was completed within a few days following 
the devaluation, the adjustment of prices can be adequately explained 
by the expected component of the exchange rate change when monthly 
data are used. 
The wholesale price index for nontraded goods is a weighted average 
of sectoral indices. The food industry sector (K20),  excluding bever- 
ages, possesses the largest weighting coefficient, 18.1 percent. In 1980 
only 6.6 percent of the total consumption of processed food was im- 
ported, whereas 90 percent of the total production originating in 51 
domestic firms was directed toward the domestic market. Moreover, 
the ratio of imported intermediate and capital goods to total production 
costs was  19.2 percent, one of  the lowest  ratios in all of  Greece’s 
industrial  sector^.^ The food industry can therefore be classified on all 
grounds as in the nontraded goods sector. 318  Louka T.  Katseli 
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-  0.05 
Fig. 9.4  The  drachma-dollar  exchange rate  and  nontraded  goods 
prices. 
Figures 9.5 and 9.6 present the monthly variation of the price index 
(DLKZO) against that of the effective and bilateral exchange rate. It is 
relatively  easy  to see that the change in  the exchange rate  almost 
systematically preceded price adjustment by two months. This obser- 
vation  is confirmed by  the econometric evidence presented in  table 
9.10, where DLK20 is regressed against previous values of itself and 
against current and lagged values of the exchange rate. In both time 
periods (1979.5-1982.12 and 1979.5-1983.12) price adjustment was rel- 
atively  sluggish, with the own first- and second-month lag generally 
significant and the  second  lag on the drachma-dollar exchange rate 
significant in both periods. 
There is no clear evidence, however, that the responsiveness of the 
price to an exchange rate change is significantly altered in the long 
period, even though the coefficient of the constant term and the overall 
explanatory power of the regression increase when 1983 is included. 
The ambiguity in the results as one moves from the aggregate to the 
sectoral data has to do with the composition of the index and with the 
institutional factors affecting price behavior. The sectoral index is a 319  Discrete Devaluation as a Signal to Price Setters 
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Fig. 9.5  The effective exchange rate and the food industry price index. 
weighted average of  the price of  products that might or might not be 
exempt from price controls. The legal basis for price controls in Greece 
is the Market-Law Code, which essentially classifies products into three 
categories:  essential and in short supply; essential and not in  short 
supply; and nonessential. The first category includes basic consumer 
goods for which, in  most cases, a maximum price is set. For some 
goods in this category, and for all goods in the second category that 
are considered essential but not key consumer goods, the Greek Min- 
istry of  Commerce sets a maximum allowable markup over average 
unit costs. The third category includes goods that are essentially exempt 
from controls (Lalonde and Papandreou 1984). 
The behavior of product prices and hence of the aggregate sectoral 
index is thus affected by the ministry's actions in adjusting the price 
ceiling as a result of pressure from firms. This is especially true in the 
food sector, a large number of whose products fall in the first category. 
Figure 9.7 illustrates the rate of change in flour prices over the period 
1973-84.  Since flour is considered  an essential commodity a price 
ceiling for it is set by the ministry. Effective prices are almost always 
set at the price ceiling. As shown in  the figure, the price has been 
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Fig. 9.6  The bilateral exchange rate and the food industry price index. 
price adjustment in August was the largest one in three years-18.7 
percent. Since firms producing  flour have limited possibilities to di- 
versify their production,6 the increase in perceived costs implied by 
the devaluation gave rise to a fall in profits and a reduction in output 
or quality. As shown in table 9.11 the average production of grain mill 
products during the first six months of  1983 was 4.5 percent lower than 
the corresponding average in 1982. 
A different type of response is evidenced by firms that can diversify 
their production across control categories, such as dairy product firms. 
Dairy firms usually produce milk, butter, cheese, and yogurt-all  items 
under price controls-as  well as ice cream, which is not  subject to 
controls. Although these firms still exercise pressure to adjust the price 
ceiling, any losses they suffer in profits and output are mitigated by 
rapid price adjustment in the noncontrolled items. As indicated in table 
9.12, while the prices of all controlled dairy products increased between 
12 and 14 percent within the first quarter of 1983, ice-cream prices rose 
by almost 10 percent between December 1982 and January  1983 and 
by almost 33 percent between December 1982 and March  1983 (also 
see figure 9.8). As there is no reason to attribute the increase in the Table 9.10  Food Price and Exchange Rate Adjustment 
DEP  C  DLK-I  DLK-2  DLK-,  DLBIE  DLBIE-I  DLBIE-2  DLEFE  DLEFE-I  DLEFE-2  R'  R*  D.W.  SEE 
1.  DLK20  ,0254 
1979.5- 1983.12  (4.24) 
2.  DLK20  .0247 
1979.5-1983.12  (4.29) 
3.  DLK20  .0244 
1979.5-1982.12  (3.28) 
4.  DLKZO  ,0244 
1979.5-1982.12  (3.64) 
-  .3455 
(2.54) 
-  ,3463 
(2.67) 
-  .3646 
(2.27) 
-  .3533 
(2.29) 
-  .2m 
(1.86) 
-  .26% 
(2.02) 
-  ,2520 
(1.53) 
-  .2434 
(1.54) 
-  ,2041 
(1.49) 
-  .2469 
(1.89) 
(1.08) 
-  .2227 
(1.44) 
-  .I725 
-.CHI83  -.0315  -.I987 
(0.72)  (0.28)  (1.74) 
-.0154  ,0231  ,2510 
(0.17)  (0.26)  (2.80) 
.W5  -.I164  -.2423 
(0.02)  (0.42)  (0.90) 
-.0375  -.0168  ,3007 
(0.27)  (0.12)  (2.14) 
.I9  .06  2.2  ,021 
.25  .I6  2.1  ,020 
.I6  .03  2.1  .023 
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Fig. 9.7  The differenced log of flour prices, 1973-84. 
relative costs of ice-cream production during that period to any other 
factor, it is reasonable to argue that the perceived increase in costs 
resulting from the devaluation was met by price overshooting of the 
noncontrolled goods. The output of dairy products stayed roughly con- 
stant in the two periods. 
Finally, within the same sector some firms produce commodities in 
the second and  third  categories of  the Market  Code, for example, 
tomato juice, tomato pulp, canned fruits, and fruit juices. In that case, 
price adjustment is distributed more evenly across goods. As indicated 
in table 9.12 between February and March of 1983 the prices of tomato 
juice and tomato pulp rose by 8.70 percent and 2.90 percent, respec- 
tively, whereas the prices of canned fruits rose sharply in January and 
February and fell in March, that is, when the prices of the controlled 
items were allowed to increase. As shown in Table 9.11 the production 
of canned fruits and vegetables was 30 percent higher in the first half 
of  1983 than in the first half of  1982 as domestic firms were able to 
capture a larger share of the domestic market from foreign firms. 
The analysis so far suggests that firms responded  to the discrete 
devaluation in a predictable fashion. If  institutional or other factors 
prevent prices from changing, the expected increase in costs implied 
by a devaluation brings about a decrease in profits and a decrease in 
output. The drop in output could be mitigated by the expected increase 
in demand, depending on the cross-elasticity of substitution of domestic 
and imported final goods. In diversified firms, on the other hand, the 323  Discrete Devaluation as a Signal to Price Setters 
Table 9.11  Monthly Indices of the Industrial Production of Specific Products 
Grain Mill  Dairy  Fruit  Canned and Preserved 
Products  Products  Juices  Fruits and Vegetables 
1982.1  148.8  154.7  176.3  11.2 
2  142.3  198.2  247.4  14.6 
3  154.0  233.1  207.2  15.6 
4  149.2  238.6  50.3  29.9 
5  141.0  288.8  22.1  30.4 
6  145.6  325.0  5.1  75.7 
7  142.6  314.1  17.0  119.8 
8  85.5  248.3  0.0  11 18.5 
9  115.2  202.4  45.9  1043.8 
10  103.9  158.7  46.2  403.3 
11  113.0  155.3  40.4  54.8 
12  106.5  145.2  106.0  32.2 
1983.1  114.9  158.2  255.6  22.3 
2  143.8  199.9  258.4  21.4 
3  159.0  220.3  115.7  21.9 
4  152.5  274.3  37.6  29.2 
5  130.6  286.5  156.7  54.4 
6  140.6  288.6  11.3  81.0 
7  132.2  257.8  24.0  452.5 
8  138.7  235.3  56.9  1494.3 
9  142.1  193.4  109.8  515.3 
10  126.6  171.5  0.0  68.6 
11  126.7  162.4  9.5  30.3 
12  117.8  151.4  30.4  23.5 
Table 9.U  The Price Adjustment of Specific Products in the Food Sector 
Food Stuffs  1982.12-  1983.1  1982.12-1983.2  1982.12-  1983.3 
Price Controlled 
Yogurt  0.00  0.0 
Milk  0.00  1.7 
Soft Cheese  0.07  3.5 
Butter, Creams  0.13  3.6 
Flour  0.00  0.0 
Farina  0.00  0.0 
Markup Regulated 
Chicken  -0.74 
Tomato Juice  0.00 














Ice Cream  9.82  28.21  32.41 
Fruit Juices  0.00  1.31  7.36 









1973  1974  1975  1976  1977  1978  1979  1980  1981  1982  1983  1984 
Fig. 9.8  Differenced log of ice-cream prices. 
loss in profits is cushioned by selective increases in the prices of non- 
controlled goods and in output expansion of those goods for which the 
demand has increased. 
The analysis also confirms the hypothesis  that, regardless of  the 
category of  price control, price adjustment is generally  sluggish, so 
that a monopolistic price adjustment model is a suitable one for the 
pricing behavior of firms. “Price contracts”  are evidenced in all the 
product cases examined here. Even though their length depends on 
institutional factors, a cursory look at pricing behavior suggests that 
at least in the noncontrolled sector contracts were in fact shortened 
as aggregate exchange rate variability rose, as shown in  figures 9.8 
and 9.9. The evidence also suggests that  recontracting occurred al- 
most  instantly in  the noncontrolled  sector, and organized  pressure 
by firms to relax price ceilings was successful within a few months, 
especially in the second product category (essential and not in short 
Overall,  the  arbitrary  control  of  prices  by  central  authorities  in 
Greece did not seem to mitigate in the medium term the inflationary 
consequences  of  the  1983  devaluation.  After  a  large  and  discrete 
adjustment of  the exchange rate, the price level was adjusted earlier 
than  expected,  thereby  lessening  the  increase  in  the  demand  for 
nontraded  goods  and  exacerbating  the  stagflationary  effects of  the 
devaluation. 
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Fig. 9.9  Differenced log of fruit juice prices. 
Notes 
1. For a review of this literature, see Katseli (1983). 
2.  This is usually guaranteed by the perfect substitutability of  all goods and assets in 
3. Defined as the ratio of  the prices of traded to nontraded goods. 
4. For an excellent review of those works, see Gordon (1981). 
5. The data on those 51 firms were obtained  from a sample of  423 firms gathered 
6.  Flour  mills usually  produce flour and farina, which  is also included  in the first 
a small, open economy and by the perfect flexibility of wages and prices. 
annually by the Bank of Greece. 
category of products. 
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Comment  Stanley W.  Black 
The paper by Louka Katseli offers us a stimulating new idea concerning 
the effects of exchange rate changes on the economy. Earlier in the 
NBER-World  Bank conference Carlos Diaz-Alejandro told us that “Juan 
Valdez the coffee picker”  knows that changes in coffee prices affect 
real income and the terms of trade in Colombia. Katseli seems to be 
telling us that “Zorba the shoemaker” knows that a discrete exchange 
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rate adjustment signals that inflation has increased in Greece. Perhaps 
this tells us that changes in inflation are as significant for Greek shop- 
keepers as changes in coffee prices are for Colombian coffee pickers. 
The basic hypothesis of the paper has two components.  First, the 
speed of  adjustment of domestic prices to discrete changes in the ex- 
change rate depends on the size of the exchange rate change; equiv- 
alently, the effect on prices is faster, the larger the changes in costs. 
Second, thefrequency of price changes rises with the size of the change 
in the exchange rate. If this hypothesis is true, a crawling peg would 
allow exchange rate changes to have larger real effects than would a 
discretely adjustable peg, ceteris paribus. 
There are some other hypotheses, not mentioned by Katseli, that 
also bear  on this question.  Discrete adjustment is often thought to 
reflect “reluctant”  adjustment, with the exchange rate lagging behind 
domestic inflation. It thus distorts the real exchange rate, imposing 
reallocation costs of the type discussed by Johnson (I%),  Hause (1966), 
and more recently Coes (1981), as resources are first driven away from 
and then pulled back into the traded goods sectors. There is also the 
“quantum”  effect first  discussed in Orcutt’s  famous (1950) article. 
Orcutt  argued  that  large,  discrete  exchange rate changes will  have 
larger real effects on trade than  smaller changes will because fixed 
costs of adjustment will prevent any response to small changes. 
Katseli derives her hypotheses from contemporary theory. The speed- 
of-adjustment hypothesis is derived from Gordon’s (1981) theory of 
sluggish adjustment to local versus global changes in demand and costs. 
Gordon used  the (1973) Lucas argument that the response to global 
demand shocks will take the form of a price increase, whereas local 
demand shocks will lead primarily to changes in real output. According 
to Katseli, a large change in the exchange rate signals a global shock, 
implying a large price response. The frequency-of-adjustment hypoth- 
esis is based on Gray’s (1978) model of  optimal contract length, which 
shows that the frequency of recontracting increases as the variance of 
industry-specific or local shocks increases. Katseli argues that a dis- 
crete exchange rate adjustment may raise uncertainty about the central 
bank’s future intentions and hence shorten the average life of contracts. 
Since a discrete, reluctant exchange rate adjustment should imply a 
higher variance of aggregate shocks, a la Johnson and Hause, it would 
have been  useful if  the paper had  examined the effect  of aggregate 
shocks on the degree of  indexation or automatic pass-through of cost 
increases, as suggested by Gray. 
Let us turn to the evidence Katseli brings forward to test the hy- 
potheses on price adjustment. I would have liked to test the speed of 
response of prices to costs by fitting markup equations. The time-series 
autoregressions on prices presented  in the paper are somewhat less 328  Louka T.  Katseli 
satisfactory, particularly since they are based on only 60 monthly ob- 
servations. And the results in tables 9.4 and 9.6  for price levels involve 
nonstationary time series. Tables 9.5 and 9.7 for price changes show 
increases in the constant terms relative to the coefficients of lagged 
price changes and therefore in the speed of adjustment, if  the period 
of the large exchange rate adjustments is included. But the increases 
in the constant terms are not statistically significant. The constant term 
in the nontraded goods equation of table 9.7 increases by 0.0021, which 
is only about 25 percent of the standard error. Thus, the results do not 
really support the hypothesis in a statistically significant way. 
Table 9.8 shows that the change in the exchange rate adds signifi- 
cantly to an autoregressive aggregate price equation in the longer time 
period that includes the large devaluation. The results for nontraded 
goods in table 9.9 also show that the lag of prices behind exchange rate 
changes shortens when 1983 is included. These statistically significant 
results appear, however, to be due to only one observation, the January 
1983 devaluation. Their robustness is therefore open to question. 
The subsequent analysis of detailed price changes for flour and dairy 
products is fascinating and suggests that the  frequency of price changes 
rose in  1983, again apparently due to the single observation. It is in- 
teresting to observe that a Johnson-Hause reallocation effect begins to 
appear for flour milling, in which the industry controlled price only 
reluctantly adjusted to increased costs. 
I am quite in sympathy with the paper’s overall conclusion that a 
crawling peg is better than a reluctant adjustment with large discrete 
changes in the exchange rate. “Exchange rate management matters,” 
one could say. Certainly, the desire to avoid resource allocation costs 
would argue for a crawling peg. And Katseli has provided some sugges- 
tive, if not conclusive, evidence that a crawling peg might minimize a 
pass-through into prices and strengthen the resulting real adjustment. 
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COn'lmeIlt  John Williamson 
I am always pleased to find a paper that assumes that firms set prices, 
rather than that prices are set by some mysterious auctioneer who is 
determined to clear all markets. The former corresponds to the way I 
think most of the world works. I have to confess that at various times 
in the last 15 years I have felt intellectually isolated because the bulk 
of the profession appeared to have abandoned contact with reality on 
this point. 
The main conclusions that Katseli lists at the end of  her paper also 
seem to me eminently reasonable. So is the observation that changes 
in the exchange rate are (or ought to be) undertaken to influence the 
real exchange rate, and not just to reduce absorption. There are other, 
and generally better, instruments to reduce absorption, namely, fiscal 
and monetary policy. Hence, I like the main features of the paper. 
The main subject of the paper is a problem I first concerned myself 
with 15 years ago when I was fighting a one-man battle in Her Majesty's 
Treasury to persuade members of the British government that if they 
wanted to save the Bretton Woods system they had better support the 
limited flexibility of exchange rates to complement the introduction of 
the special drawing rights (SDR). One of the devastating charges then 
made  against  the crawling peg was that it would be neutralized by 
induced inflation, since an announcement that a necessary devaluation 
would be implemented gradually by a crawl would cause all wage ad- 
justments to go up in proportion and would prevent any change in the 
real exchange rate. I was invited to contrast this with the heroic way 
the British public was accepting Harold Wilson's  assurance that the 
pound  in  its pocket had not been devalued in November  1967. The 
argument did not seem to me very convincing, but my lack of conviction 
had no empirical evidence to back it up, which doubtless contributed 
to my loss of  the battle for limited flexibility. 
I was not, incidentally, impressed at that time by the Orcutt argument 
mentioned in Black's  comment above. I think this was because I re- 
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called a paper of  Harberger’s in the  1950s  that made the point  that 
though many agents might not respond to a small devaluation, others 
might be pushed over a threshold. Hence, there is really no very con- 
vincing  reason  to  expect  a  nonlinearity  of  the  type  Orcutt  was 
postulating. 
In any event the 1969 debate in the British Treasury was not satis- 
factory. The question continued to trouble me, so that ten years later, 
when I organized the conference in Rio on the crawling peg, I invited 
the authors of the country papers to present any relevant evidence on 
the subject. I was not rewarded for that invitation. 
My claim used to be that there is no good reason to expect a greater 
neutralization of  a nominal exchange rate change with a crawl than 
with a discrete devaluation. Katseli makes a much stronger claim in 
her paper. She argues that a large change in the exchange rate is actually 
more likely to generate neutralization. 
I did not find her evidence in support of this convincing; indeed, she 
herself describes it as inconclusive.  Some evidence in the paper, in 
fact, seems to point in the opposite direction to her thesis. Table 9.3, 
for example, seems to say that the change in the nominal exchange 
rate was offset by about 50 percent within six months after the big 
devaluation in early 1983. Subsequently, the crawl was accelerated and 
the real exchange rate went down a bit more. It is not clear that there 
is any difference in the pass-through coefficient between the two cases. 
I therefore remain unconvinced that there is any evidence to suggest 
that the extent of the pass through differs systematically between crawl- 
ing and discrete changes. 
When I first started thinking about this issue, some 20 years ago, the 
equation  that  represented  a  conventional  way  of  describing  profit- 
maximizing behavior in the context of imperfect competition was: 
P  = ap + (1 - a)c = aep’ + (1 - a)c, 
where p represents the average price being charged by competitors, 
and c represents unit costs. In the context of the impact of a devaluation 
on the prices  of  differentiated  manufactured products  (McKinnon’s 
tradables I), the natural interpretation of  the price of  competitors is 
the exchange rate (e) times the foreign price of similar products (p+). 
The question arose as to the value of  a.  This was answered in  the 
empirical literature on pass-through coefficients.  It turns out that  a 
varies from something modest like 0.1 in the case of  a large country 
like the United States to something like 0.9 in a small, open economy 
like Costa Rica, but typically it is not equal to unity even then. This 
suggests that the imperfect competition framework is an appropriate 
and useful one, and that the “law  of one price”  is not an adequate 
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In applying this framework to devaluation, one notes that the prices 
of  competitive goods rise and thus pull up the prices of  competing 
goods, thereby reinforcing the cost-push effects that come via imported 
intermediate goods and the wage pressures generated as workers try 
to restore their real incomes when faced with the price increases. One 
would expect that when applying this type of equation to nontraded 
goods, the reaction to an exchange rate change would be much less 
pronounced; and that also seems to be empirically confirmed (Corbo 
1983). 
But applying this approach today, as opposed to 20 years ago, one 
would do some things differently. One would no longer include simply 
the previous values of  p and c but would also specify the expected 
future values of those variables over the contract period. One might 
even analyze whether the contract period would be expected to remain 
constant. Nonetheless, the basic approach is still valid. 
The relevance of these recollections to the Katseli paper is to explain 
the theoretical basis of my longstanding presumption that there is no 
systematic difference between discrete and crawling devaluations in 
effectively changing real exchange rates. If price setting is determined 
(rationally) by the twin influences of competitive prices and own costs, 
the manner in which a given change between the two is accomplished 
should have no effect on the price set. My presumption that it does 
not has not been overturned by Katseli’s paper. 
Let me finally remark that there is one interesting case that reinforces 
my view and is encouraging for those of us with a prejudice in favor 
of the crawling peg. Three years ago Colombia set out to devalue its 
currency with the express purpose of restoring the country’s compet- 
itiveness, not by a discrete devaluation but instead by accelerating the 
crawl. Unfortunately it set out too late-it  is not clear that Colombia 
will get by without an economic crisis similar to that now facing most 
of the rest of Latin America. But the crawl has achieved a more com- 
petitive real exchange rate. That is perhaps the most persuasive evi- 
dence so far that a crawl can in fact increase competitiveness. 
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